
EXHIBIT 2

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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     MIRROR WORLDS TECHNOLOGIES,
     LLC,
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                     Plaintiff,
                                      New York, N.Y.
5
                                              17 Civ. 3473(JGK)
                 V.
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     FACEBOOK, INC.,
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                     Defendant.
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                                               July 17, 2017
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                                               4:40 p.m.
     Before:
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                           HON. JOHN G. KOELTL,
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                                               District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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17
      RUSS AUGUST & KABAT
18
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
     BY: MARC A. FENSTER
19
20
     AMSTER ROTHSTEIN & EBENSTEIN, LLP
           Attorneys for Plaintiff
21
     BY: CHARLES R. MACEDO
22
      COOLEY, LLP
23
          Attorneys for Defendant
     BY: HEIDI KEEFE
24
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1	(Case called)
2	MR. FENSTER: Good afternoon, your Honor. Marc
3	Fenster, with Russ, August & Kabat, on behalf of the plaintiff.
4	With me today is Charles Macedo.
5	MS. KEEFE: Good afternoon, your Honor. Heidi Keefe
6	on behalf of Facebook.
7	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Good to see you all.
8	I have your Rule 26(f) report. What I don't have is
9	the courtesy copy of the complaint and the answer, which my
10	local rules ask both sides to provide me a courtesy copy of.
11	MR. FENSTER: I apologize to the court, your Honor.
12	MS. KEEFE: My apologies, your Honor. I will make
13	sure to get you that.
14	MR. MACEDO: Your Honor, I have both right here if you
15	would like.
16	MS. KEEFE: I appreciate that. Thank you, sir.
17	THE COURT: All right. Fine.
18	I appreciate it's a patent infringement case.
19	Mr. Fenster, do you want to just tell me about your
20	case?
21	MR. FENSTER: Sure. Your Honor, do you prefer that I
22	use the podium?
23	THE COURT: Either way.
24	MR. FENSTER: Your Honor, this is a patent

infringement case involving three patents that are asserted.

There is some history with the patents, not between these parties, but there is some history that you will hear about in this case. The patents relate to an invention by Professor Gelertner from Yale and several other inventors, and it relates to a document management system that is a stream-based system.

Instead of the old, conventional file directory system of storing files in directories with file names, he envisioned and invented a new stream-based system that uses a main stream and a sub stream that are both persistent. This is described in the '227, '439 and '538 patents.

The accused devices, the accused systems are Facebook's system that is implemented on two types of servers that implement their News Feed, for example.

The patent is owned by Mirror Worlds Technologies,

LLC. The patents have expired. They expired last year. So
this is a reasonable royalty case. We will be seeking
reasonable royalty in terms of damages.

The '227 patent --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. The royalties for the period while the patents were valid and allegedly infringed by Facebook?

MR. FENSTER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FENSTER: And then the '227 patent, I mentioned

that there is some history with that '227 patent. In prior litigation against Apple and Microsoft, that patent was litigated, it was subjected to two reexaminations in which the patent office upheld the validity of the claims asserted in the '227 in this case. The '227 patent was also challenged in a CBM — covered business method — proceeding before the PTAB, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, addressing such issues as patent subject matter eligibility under Section 101 and the PTAB denied institution, finding the patent valid in that case as well.

The claim from that patent, the '227, that will be at issue in this case, is Claim 13 in terms of the independent claims.

THE COURT: Okay. It is a little premature, but do you think that the issues involved in the patent or the patents are so complicated that a person of my vastly limited technical expertise would require the assistance of a court-appointed expert? I'm not a big fan of court-appointed experts, but I usually ask the parties about that. Or do you both think that either the technology that's involved in the patents is not so complicated or your own experts can explain it to me that it won't be necessary to have a court-appointed expert just to assist the court?

MR. FENSTER: Our view, your Honor, is that a court-appointed expert is not necessary in this case. While

the subject matter is technical, both sides will have experts, and I think that while there are some technical issues certainly involved in the patents, they are not so impenetrable that, if we do our jobs right, we can't explain it well to the court. So I do not think that the court will need or benefit from a court-appointed expert.

THE COURT: I am going to turn to Facebook anyway right now for an explanation.

I should say at the outset I have a niece who works for Kirkland who has, and I suspect still does, do work on Kirkland matters for Facebook. I don't disqualify myself in Kirkland matters. She is a nonshare partner at Kirkland. I would disqualify myself and wouldn't expect to see a matter involving Kirkland on which she was working, and I haven't had a situation where I would disqualify myself in a Facebook matter. I don't know anyone, as far as I know, at the plaintiff's firm and I actually don't know or at least don't know that I know anyone at Cooley.

MS. KEEFE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KEEFE: I personally don't see a conflict there, nothing that we would raise.

As to your Honor's question about the use of a technical expert, I agree with Mr. Fenster that this is not the type of a case that I think your Honor would require one. In

fact, I look very much forward to helping teach your Honor about the technology, and I think you will enjoy it. It is not overly complicated. It certainly is interesting, but it is just about different ways to store information on the back side and then potentially present it on the front side.

As far as the case for Facebook goes, one of the reasons that we actually were seeking your Honor's help in some more rigid early claim charting or trying to understand the allegations against Facebook is because Facebook truly doesn't understand how the patents apply to us.

I think after plaintiff sees our source code -- as soon as we agree on a protective order, we will be producing our source code happily, so that they can understand that we just don't store things. We don't have that type of an operating system on our back end. And that was one of the reasons that we had asked the court for a deviation from the New York Southern District local rules, which don't require that strenuous of claim charting up front, nor do they allow for us to ask an interrogatory which also asks for claim charts, so that we can understand how they are reading the claims to cover the technology that we have.

So that is why we asked your Honor for the deviation from the Southern District of New York local rules to implement something closer to the patent local rules from the Northern District of California which require claim charts up front that

can only be amended with good cause. And of course we would give them the code far in advance of that so that those charts could take the benefit of really understanding what the technology is.

And if for any reason your Honor didn't want to go there, I would at least ask for essentially dispensation from the local rules which also prevent us from asking a contention type interrogatories until the end of the case, to be able to serve one early, again, so that we could understand how they think that these claims actually apply to the system that Facebook has, since we don't think they are the same.

THE COURT: Okay. We obviously have more limited procedures than the Northern District of California, and we are enthusiastic about our more limited procedures and think that, with all respect to the Northern District of California, they are too rigid, they cause too much unnecessary work, and they are unnecessary.

Similarly, with respect to interrogatories, the

Southern District in general is resistent to interrogatories

because we think that they are written by lawyers, answered by

lawyers, and tend to obfuscate, rather than clarify. Because

what lawyers do is they try to answer interrogatories in such a

way as to keep all of their options open, so you get long

obfuscatory answers that really don't move the case along a

lot.

A third point -- because I know it is raised in the Rule 26(f) report -- is, our local rules specifically don't set up a date for the claim construction hearing because each case is different and our experience in many cases is you don't need a claim construction hearing prior to the motion for summary judgment. It certainly depends on the individual cases.

In some cases, the parties come in and say, We have 200 claims at issue, and as to each of those claims, we think that there are five separate claim construction issues that your Honor has to decide; and, lo and behold, you get to the motion for summary judgment and you find out that there are just a few issues and that everything that you have been asked to construe with the exercise of a lot of work turns out to be nondispositive, so that the motion for summary judgment might actually be the occasion for the claim construction hearing and the need to construe the claims in light of what the parties tee up as the dispositive issues.

This may or may not be that case. I go in with the background of our local rules and the background of being able to decide claim construction issues in the context of motions for summary judgment, and with an aversion that can be overcome, depending upon the individual case, to having a schedule based upon the need for a claim construction hearing and the subsequent deadlines keyed to the decision at the claim construction hearing. Because often without knowing what the

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dispositive issues are for a motion for summary judgment, the tendency of the parties would be to keep as many balls in the air as possible and ask for a construction on as many things as possible, even though they may not be dispositive in the case.

So I don't know how this case will proceed. I am perfectly happy to keep matters open, and things may change depending upon how the case develops.

So the plaintiff in the submission before me said essentially Facebook doesn't even know at this point what we are going to say, or the specifics, as least as I understand it, the specifics of the patent claims that were allegedly infringed. Now, if the plaintiff comes forward with 200 alleged claims that were allegedly infringed in 400 different ways, maybe I will think differently about where the case is. And maybe if, at another conference, after Facebook has disclosed the source code to the plaintiff under a confidentiality order and renews the argument to me that there is, you know, no basis for the case, I can look again at the issue of an interrogatory, contention interrogatory, or more. But the plaintiff may be able to persuade me that that is not a good idea. I certainly have, in other cases, despite the local rule, or consistently with the local rule, pursuant to court order, said, yes, you can give some limited interrogatories.

So let me ask another question. The plaintiff has said that there has been litigation with Apple and Microsoft

with respect to the same patents, one or more of the patents.

What was the outcome of those litigations?

MR. FENSTER: So both have been resolved through settlement and licensing. The Apple litigation went farther. That actually went to a jury verdict.

THE COURT: Where?

MR. FENSTER: In the Eastern District of Texas. And there was a verdict of infringement and validity. There was a JAMOL on infringement and then a subsequent appeal. The validity determination was upheld. The JAMOL was upheld. A subsequent case was filed and a settlement ensued. There were, I believe, two orders construing the claims of the '227 in those cases. The Microsoft case was also filed in the Eastern District of Texas, and that was settled as well.

THE COURT: Okay. This case was filed in the Southern District rather than the Eastern District of Texas. Was that because of the Supreme Court's decision on venue?

MR. FENSTER: The venue consideration did -- we did file in the Southern District of New York because Facebook has significant offices here and we thought that venue was proper. I think that *T.C. Heartland* had not yet issued at the time, but it was certainly pending at the time that we filed in May.

THE COURT: Well, welcome.

MR. FENSTER: Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. So looking over the 26(f) report, I

have essentially given you my views that we should have a strict schedule rather than a delayed schedule, depending upon the claim construction hearing, which may not go forward before I see the motions for summary judgment. I am open if the number of claims or alleged infringement contentions become too great.

I was troubled by the fact that you all, even with a firm schedule, have scheduled the case to take two years. That is a long time in this court. Both sides think it is going to take that long? How much is a realistic ad damnum from the plaintiff.

MR. FENSTER: I'm sorry. I missed the last question, your Honor.

THE COURT: How much is a realistic ad damnum from the plaintiff? What are we talking about?

MR. FENSTER: In terms of?

THE COURT: Money.

MR. FENSTER: Oh.

THE COURT: Damages, ad damnum.

MR. FENSTER: Oh, we were talking about schedule.

We are formulating -- the damages will be formulated after we get discovery from the plaintiff. I expect it will be a significant case. Something in the \$100 million range I expect to be the damage number at trial.

THE COURT: Okay. What was the Apple verdict in the

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MR. FENSTER: The verdict was \$625 million, and that

3 was vacated on JAMOL.

Eastern District of Texas?

THE COURT: Sorry?

MR. FENSTER: It was vacated on JAMOL for infringement, not because of damages. But the damage number that was awarded by the jury was \$625 million.

THE COURT: Is Facebook in a different position from Apple.

MR. FENSTER: In terms of?

THE COURT: In terms of the case.

MR. FENSTER: In general, I think yes. The accused systems are different. I think that the infringement by Facebook, at least based on what we have seen so far, is more clearly within exactly what Professor Gelertner was envisioning when he came up with his invention.

THE COURT: Facebook says not at all.

MR. FENSTER: They say not at all, and we will review the source code, and that's what the case will ultimately be about.

But in terms of our view, they do have different -the accused systems are different. We think that the accused
system in this case is actually a little bit clearer
infringement read based on what we have seen so far without the
benefit of discovery than -- not than the Apple case was, it

was just a different reading. Anyway, so they infringe differently. The accused systems, they infringe in different ways. The scope of infringement is a little bit different. The damages model I expect to be a little bit different as well. Facebook, the way they derive their revenue is a little bit different than Apple.

THE COURT: Okay.

Yes.

MS. KEEFE: Your Honor, the only point I would make from that is exactly what I was saying in terms of not understanding the read. We don't operate the same way that Apple does. We are not the same kind of company. We don't have an operating system. The patents talk about an operating system and the way things are stored. So the fact that they are using the same patents against Facebook that they did against Apple is precisely the reason that we really don't understand the infringement read against us, and that is why — I fully appreciate everything your Honor has said, but that's why I am so insistent that some type of early discovery would be so useful.

Typically when we try to ask those types of questions during a 30(b)(6) or some type of deposition we get, no, no, that's for the expert, that's a legal argument, we are not going to tell you, and that's why we are so desperate to have something like a chart, interrogatory, or something of that

nature, so that we know what we are aiming at as the case goes forward since we are so different from Apple, even per Mr. Fenster's own admission.

THE COURT: Well, under the proposed schedule, there will be disclosure of the asserted claims and infringement contentions by August 31, and then Facebook would have -- why do you think that wouldn't give you sufficient understanding of what the plaintiff is claiming?

MS. KEEFE: Because the way I understand the rules, your Honor, is simply that they have to say it is Claims 1 through 4 against News Feed and it doesn't explain to us how or what within News Feed does that. The complaint already says at least one claim of each of the patents against News Feed. The problem is, we really don't understand how they are reading it against News Feed since, like I said and like Mr. Fenster has said, it is so different from Apple or the types of products they were accusing Apple of infringing with.

Unless the infringement contention needs to have more, something like, What are they attacking in Facebook as the stream, the thing that has every piece of data stored chronologically, something other than simply pointing at a large product like News Feed and just saying it is in there somewhere does not explain to us how those claims are being read on the product.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. KEEFE: It is unfortunately not like a product case where you can easily take the product apart and kind of guess which piece goes against which. It's an entire code base.

THE COURT: All right.

Plaintiff?

MR. FENSTER: Your Honor, the local rules provide an ordered system for disclosure of infringement contentions. We have provided a very detailed complaint as you go through, and then we will provide the information per the discovery that we get in this case. This is a case where we will have to review source code and then we will have expert disclosures, and that will be — the Southern District has local rules —

THE COURT: No, I understand. I was involved in drafting these, and they were meant to be simple. They were meant to avoid needless work. But we will see if in fact they work or they don't work.

How many claims are alleged to be infringed.

MR. FENSTER: So, your Honor, our actual disclosure will be on August 31. What we have identified in the complaint are three representative claims from — one representative claim from each patent. There are only a handful of independent claims from each of the patents.

So, for example, for the '227, I expect that Claim 13 will be the independent claim that's asserted. There are only

I think four independent claims in each of the other two patents.

So this is not a huge number of claims and we don't intend to unduly burden the court or the parties. We intend to litigate this case efficiently and in a directed way to test our infringement theory.

MS. KEEFE: Your Honor, there are over 115 claims in the patents at issue, and the fact that there is limited number of independents does not mean that they are not going to assert multiple dependents to try to get away from prior art. So everything that I have asked for I think still stands, and the very fact that Mr. Fenster implied just a few minutes ago that it might be not until we get expert reports that we understand the infringement allegations, to me, just doesn't work to move the case forward, especially if this is a case that could be early resolved by virtue of the fact that the claims simply don't read on our products.

THE COURT: Okay.

Plaintiff tells me that there are how many independent claims in the three patents?

MR. FENSTER: There are approximately, I think there are four independent claims in the '439; four in the '538, I believe that's right; and one that will be asserted -- so there are four independent claims in the '439, there are three independent claims in the '538, and there is one that will be

asserted from the '227.

THE COURT: And how many dependent claims do you foresee?

MR. FENSTER: I don't have that number exactly. But I take what the court has said and we will not be unreasonable; and, if we are unreasonable, I expect to answer to the court for it.

THE COURT: All right. It is fairly simple, right? I will remember what you have said -- by the way, did one of you ask for the court reporter? Or both of you?

MR. MACEDO: Yes, your Honor, we asked, just because we knew that there was a disputed issue on the transcript.

THE COURT: Okay. It is unusual for me to have a court reporter at a conference with the lawyers because I tend to trust the lawyers who appear before me. So when they say things, I rely on the fact that they -- is Facebook standing because they asked for the reporter, too?

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$$ KEEFE: No. In fact, we did not ask for it. I was very surprised to see one.

THE COURT: That's okay. You don't have to underline what I say.

So I trust the lawyers and I tend to remember what lawyers tell me. I tell lawyers at conferences that if they should see a court reporter appear at a conference, that is not a good sign, because it is an indication that this is a case

where I can't trust the lawyers. But in cases which have high stakes, sometimes the lawyers think that they have to ask for a reporter. They have every right to ask for a reporter. But it does make me at least wary of the representations by the lawyers, but at least we have a transcript then.

Okay. So where we were was, I was raising a question about whether a two-year schedule is really necessary. Facebook's schedule would have been even longer because it would depend on when I would decide the claim construction issues.

So you tell me. You have obviously litigated these cases before. You know this case. If you tell me it is really necessary to have May of 2019 as the date, and realistically that would be put off, because if you are doing dispositive motions on January 11, they are not going to be fully briefed until March, and then it will take time to decide those motions, so May of 2019 would be put off. So you tell me whether close of discovery is December 14, 2018. If I cut back on that, it would be arbitrary on my part, because I have no basis to tell the parties that they really have to finish it earlier.

MS. KEEFE: Your Honor, I think the parties worked very hard to come to a plan together that works, given we have litigated actually against each other before, and --

THE COURT: Do you get along?

MS. KEEFE: We do, very much so, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That's good.

MS. KEEFE: And I think that the schedule gives us the leeway that sometimes has to happen when other people have busy schedules and you need small extensions, this schedule allows for all of that. It also accommodates both parties' other trial dates, so that we can stick to something firm. So I would implore your Honor to stick with it as it is presented.

THE COURT: Great. I will.

MR. FENSTER: Your Honor, just — this schedule was something that we worked together. Our preference is certainly to have a shorter schedule; and, if the court is inclined, the place to carve back, I think, would be from the close of fact discovery. I think several months can be taken off of that if the court is inclined. If not, this is something that

Ms. Keefe and her team and our team worked out to come to you with an agreed schedule, and we are okay with it. But if the court would like a shorter one, we concur.

THE COURT: You mean the time from September to December?

MR. FENSTER: No. That time is actually pretty reasonable, and I think is relatively blocked. The time -- the close of fact discovery being September 28, this has a close of fact discovery and a close of expert discovery.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. FENSTER: The close of fact discovery is September 28, 2018. That's a long time for fact discovery. The parties have actually agreed on reasonable limits on fact discovery that you can see.

THE COURT: I saw it.

MR. FENSTER: So I think that September 2018 is actually longer than we need for fact discovery and we could move that whole schedule, the whole back end of the schedule up by three or four months by shifting everything up, starting with close of fact discovery. Especially if we are not waiting for a claim construction hearing necessarily, after the parties brief claim construction in February, we will be able to finish discovery.

THE COURT: The defendant disagrees with that, I take it.

MS. KEEFE: Yes, your Honor. We worked very hard to come up with a schedule that would work for both sides, including intervening dates and things of that nature.

THE COURT: Okay. I am not going to change the dates. I have already cut back on the defendant's proposal by a lot by not making it contingent on when I would get around to your claim construction hearing. So I will keep your dates. You can just give me a scheduling order that incorporates your definite dates.

Claim construction hearing to be set by the court.

You know you will need a premotion conference before a dispositive motion. The hearing plainly has to be set at a later point. What you should have, you have a motions in limine date. What I would do with the motions in limine date is, there should be the joint pretrial order, requests to charge, voir dire, motions in limine, due 21 days after decision of dispositive motions. It is not realistic in this case, but it is 21 days after decision of dispositive motions or the close of expert discovery, if no dispositive motions or Daubert motions, then responses and objections seven days thereafter.

MS. KEEFE: Your Honor, may I ask a question?

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KEEFE: So you said it is either 21 days after a decision on dispositive motion or after the close of expert discovery. Does that mean if a motion is filed after the close of expert discovery, that controls and it is only 21 days after experts if no motions are filed?

THE COURT: Right.

MS. KEEFE: Thank you. Just wanted to make sure.

THE COURT: I said or the close of expert discovery, if no dispositive motions.

MS. KEEFE: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Responses and objections seven days thereafter, and then you will be ready for trial. So ready

trial 48 hours' notice, and I will give you more time than that, but ready trial 48 hours' notice 21 days after submission of the joint pretrial order.

MR. FENSTER: Your Honor, may I ask, is it your preference to have the *Daubert* motions decided with summary judgment dispositive motions or with the motions *in limine*?

THE COURT: My general preference is to have them with motions in limine, but I see that you put them in at the same time as the dispositive motions. So if you think that the Daubert motion really belongs with the dispositive motions because the dispositive motions rely on expert testimony and you really want to get a motion in to say that the experts can't be relied upon, that's okay.

MR. FENSTER: They can be filed with the motions in limine.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MR. FENSTER: So we didn't know which way the court preferred it. If the court prefers it with the motions in limine, what I understand you to be saying now is they can be filed with the dispositive motions, but you will also accept them with the motions in limine, is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KEEFE: Understood.

THE COURT: If the dispositive motions really depend on a *Daubert* motion, you can file your *Daubert* motion along

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with the dispositive motion. I know that districts differ. Mv preference is not to clutter a dispositive motion with other motions which are thinly disquised efforts to evade the page So it is not preferred to file a motion to strike the supporting affidavit on a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the following paragraphs refer to evidence that's not properly considered on a motion for summary judgment, and to have that be a separate 25-page motion with an accompanying appendix that attacks the evidence on the motion for summary judgment. But I am told that that is -- I mean, it happens from time to time in this court, and I am told that lawyers believe that in some other districts that's the way to proceed and it's really necessary if you are going to challenge the purported evidence that's being proffered in support of the motion for summary judgment. It is not common in this district and it is, in my view, plainly, an effort to circumvent the page limits.

Similarly, and I am sure that we will get to this down the road, I have a 25-page limit for briefs in support and in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and parties have been known to attempt to circumvent that by incorporating by reference their 56.1 statement under our local rules or incorporating by reference their supporting affidavits with a statement that in order to avoid repetition and for the benefit of the court, they incorporate by reference the supporting

affidavits. It's not for the court's benefit. It is to circumvent the 25-page limit. Briefs have to be self-contained. They have to contain a statement of the facts on which the motion is based as well as the law. If you need more pages, ask for it. Don't do by subterfuge what you can't do directly. Don't fiddle with the font, eliminate margins, compress the type.

Okay. I think it would be useful in this case, because you have -- I will sign the 26(f) report and so order it just because it contains agreements with respect to discovery that I think are very useful. So I will sign it, and then you can also present to me the agreed-upon schedule which I will also sign.

I will set up another conference with you in mid December, which should be enough to see where you all are in terms of claim construction and contentions.

MS. KEEFE: May I simply go grab my calendar, your Honor, so I can --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. KEEFE: Excuse me.

THE COURT: Do you think that's time enough?

MS. KEEFE: I think it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you want me to do it earlier, I would do it earlier. But I think, under your schedule, mid December is probably the best.

MS. KEEFE: The only reason that I think earlier is better is because if we were to come back and say to your Honor, we really do need that interrogatory, having it earlier so that it could then be used by the parties in the claim construction efforts, that's where I think it would be very helpful to perhaps meet with your Honor either in October or November.

THE COURT: Fine. I will meet with you at the end of October. And all you have to do to meet with me is write me a letter.

MS. KEEFE: Thank you, your Honor. Let me go grab my calendar and we can pick a date.

THE COURT: Sure.

(Pause)

MS. KEEFE: Thank you, your Honor.

MR. FENSTER: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. FENSTER: I anticipate that October may be a bit early. We are in mid July. We do not have a protective order negotiated yet and no discovery of source code or anything else has been made.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FENSTER: So I anticipate that October may be early, and it may be more useful on the time frame that the court indicated.

1	THE COURT: But shouldn't it be before November 17.
2	MS. KEEFE: That was what I was suggesting, your
3	Honor.
4	MR. FENSTER: November 17?
5	THE COURT: That's the exchange of proposed claim
6	construction terms.
7	MS. KEEFE: That's right. That's why I was suggesting
8	something earlier, your Honor.
9	Your Honor, I have a PTAB Patent Trial and Appeal
10	Board trial that day, so I will be in Washington, D.C.
11	THE COURT: The 9th?
12	MS. KEEFE: I could come up here from D.C. very
13	easily, your Honor.
14	MR. FENSTER: I have a summary judgment hearing in
15	Northern District of California that day, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: The 10th?
17	MR. MACEDO: The 10th is Veterans Day.
18	MS. KEEFE: I can do it, your Honor, but I don't know
19	if he can make it out from California in time.
20	THE COURT: The 14th?
21	MS. KEEFE: I could do the 14th, your Honor. We are
22	getting very close to the date of the 17th is the only problem
23	if anything needed to happen. I wonder if we could go backward
24	as week.
25	MR. FENSTER: Your Honor, I am actually scheduled to

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be here in New York for the 16th/17th. If we could schedule it 1 2 for the 15th, that would save a separate trip. 3 MS. KEEFE: Mr. Fenster, I'm sorry. I have a summary 4 judgment hearing in the Northern District on the 16th, so I 5 can't do that. THE COURT: How about November 3? 6 7 I could do that, your Honor. MS. KEEFE: 8 THE COURT: 2:30, November 3. 9 Thank you, your Honor. MS. KEEFE: 10 THE COURT: No. Hold on. I'm waiting. 11 MS. KEEFE: Oh, I apologize. 12 THE COURT: I am waiting for Mr. Fenster. 13 MR. FENSTER: Thank you, your Honor. I think that 14 works for us. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Great. November 3, at 2:30 p.m., another conference; and if you need to talk to me before then, 16 17 I could set up a telephone conference with you so that you 18 don't have to fly in. 19 MS. KEEFE: I appreciate that your Honor. Thank you 20 very much. 21 MR. MACEDO: Your Honor, you said 2:30? 22 THE COURT: 2:30.

Okay. Anything else we can do today?

MR. FENSTER: Not for plaintiff, your Honor.

MS. KEEFE: I can't think of anything, your Honor.

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               THE COURT: Okay. Good to see you all. I look
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      forward to working with you.
               MS. KEEFE: Thank you, your Honor. Thank you for your
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      time.
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               MR. FENSTER: Thank you, your Honor.
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